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Abstract
Sometimes it is useful to be able to separate between the
management of a set of resources, and the access to the re-
sources themselves. Current accounts of delegation do not
allow such distinctions to be easily made, however. We in-
troduce a new model for delegation to address this issue.
The approach is based on the idea of controlling the pos-
sible shapes of delegation chains. We use constraints to
restrict the capabilities at each step of delegation. Con-
straints may reflect e.g. group memberships, timing con-
straints, or dependencies on external data. Regular expres-
sions are used to describe chained constraints. We present
a number of example delegation structures, based on a sce-
nario of collaborating organisations.
1 Introduction
Consider the following motivating example: Organisa-
tion  produces some form of electronic documents which
it regards as sensitive for some reason. The documents may
have commercial value, or they may be classified in a mil-
itary sense. Organisation  wishes to outsource some ad-
ministrative task concerning its IT system to some other or-

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ganisation,  . Included among  ’s tasks will be the assign-
ment of access rights, according to policies established by
 . For instance, a user or customer of  wishing to access
some document should, if the request adheres to  ’s poli-
cies, be assigned that right by  . Not included among  ’s
privileges, on the other hand, should be the right to access
the documents for itself.
The natural solution to this problem is to use delega-
tion.  wishes to delegate to  some administrative priv-
ilege over some resource, though not necessarily the privi-
lege to use the resource for itself. In our approach we make
this distinction explicit and we give a formalism for repre-
senting fine-grained delegation of privileges both of access-
level and management-level type as explained in [5].
Acknowledging the danger of muddying further an al-
ready somewhat infected terminology of delegation, the
purpose of this paper is to propose a new view of delega-
tion, based on two key ideas:
1. The use of regular expressions to constrain the shape
of delegation trees.
2. The capability of delegators - principals that issue del-
egations - to further refine those constraints as the del-
egation trees are being constructed.
By means of (1) we achieve enough expressiveness to
easily handle our motivating scenario, as well as many more
of a more realistic shape. By means of (2) we make sure
that the expressiveness does not get out of hand — as few
constraints as necessary need be given up front, and as the
delegation tree is gradually built up, new constraints can be
introduced as needed.  	
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Figure 1. Example group hierarchy
To illustrate the approach let  be some authorisation,
such as the right to read document  . Consider the group
hierarchy shown in fig. 1. Here,  is some global group
for the example,  and  are the groups (organisations)
of the motivating example,  is the owner of  , and 
will be the initial receiver in  of authorisation from  .
Being the owner,  is expected to possess all delegation
rights concerning  . In our approach this is expressed by a
certificate, or access control entry, of the shape

fiffffifl !#"!$%&$(')+*%,
where-



"
is a constraint expressing that   is authorised
to pass on  rights to  in zero or more steps,
-
'
 is time of issuance
-/.
is issuer (initially left unspecified)
Now,   wishes to transfer to  , a specific subgroup of 
trusted by  for this purpose, the authority to create an or-
ganisation within  for assigning  privileges to members
of  . This is achieved by   issuing the following certifi-
cate:
10
ff2fl+3"4#$5$%'
0
*7698
This certificate is regarded as valid since:
1. It is issued by   .
2.

 assigns privileges concerning  to delegate to (re-
finements of) 
"
3. +
"
 is a refinement of 
"
as a regular language,
given the group hierarchy of fig. 1.
The certificate
10
expresses an authorisation for  , namely
the right to issue new certificates of the shape
;:
ff2fl<=>$5$%'
:
*7?98
where 
=
is some subgroup of  , or maybe of the shape
;@
ff2fl
0
 "
:
#$5$%'
@
*(?98
in this way step by step creating, within  , an organisation
with authority to administer the rights (  ) within  .
Observe that
 0
and its derivatives can only be used to
grant  authorisations to members of  , so if we assume
that  and  are disjoint, no member of  can use 10 to
grant  to itself.
The objective of this paper is to motivate and introduce
this model of delegation, in the hope it will be seen as con-
tributing a new and interesting mechanism for transferring
authority between organisations in a flexible and control-
lable way.
Although this work is influenced by the work in the Trust
Management area (see [2, 1, 8, 7] and [3]), its goal and focus
is somewhat different. In this work, we do not address the
issue of distribution of privileges as it is done in e.g. Sim-
ple Public Key Infrastructure (SPKI) [3]. In our model, we
assume that there is a central authorisation server that ver-
ifies each delegation attempt separately. The focus of this
work is instead on how to decentralise, in a controlled and
verifiable way, the management (administration) of rights.
The authorisation server as a central verifier will approve
delegations as well as access permissions based on earlier
approved delegations and certain global information such
as revocations.
Earlier work on delegation has considered the virtues and
otherwise in imposing controls on the shape of delegation
trees. In [3], in particular, it is argued that, in SPKI, a princi-
pal possessing the right to delegate some permission should
also have the right to delegate that permission to herself.
This issue highlights an important way in which our setup
differs from that of SPKI. In SPKI, authorisations are bound
to public-private key pairs. A principal possessing a delega-
tion right must also have the right to produce a key pair to
which the delegated authorisation is bound. This key pair it
can acquire for itself, of course.
So, if the application at hand requires distinctions to be
made between permissions and the power to create permis-
sions, the SPKI model of binding authorisations to key pairs
must be somehow amended to allow key bindings to be con-
strained, or alternatively some other mechanism, such as
ACL’s, must be used.
In the paper we introduce and motivate the concept of
constrained delegation. The paper focuses squarely on the
handling of delegation trees; we are not concerned with is-
sues of distribution, binding, or enforcement mechanisms.
We give, in section 2, a simple set-based semantical model,
formalising the central notions of delegation chain, chain
constraints, certificate, and authorisation. On this basis we
establish, in section 3, a soundness result providing a ba-
sic healthiness property for the relationship between delega-
tion chains and certificates. In section 4 we proceed to give
a possible syntactical representation for chain constraints.
The semantical framework imposes few restrictions on the
way this is done. Here one proposal is given, based on a
restricted form of regular expressions. We discuss some is-
sues involved in choosing a good representation and give a
couple of examples, mainly to illustrate the constructions
that are involved. Then, in section 5, a more comprehensive
scenario is discussed based on the idea of a number of na-
tional defence task forces delegating authority to a joint UN
command. In a first reading of the paper it may be worth-
while to skip directly to this section, before going into the
formal definitions. Several issues discussed briefly in the
conclusion are left for future work, including revocation se-
mantics, static and dynamic constraints, and practical reali-
sations.
2 The Formal Model
2.1 Certificates
The fundamental notion is that of a constraint. In this
paper the nature of constraints is left primitive. For all prac-
tical purposes it suffices to think of constraints as (time-
varying) group membership constraints, as above. So con-
straints will be equipped with a partial order of entailment,
or containment, and there will be a satisfaction relation ex-
plaining when (at what times) a constraint will be satisfied
by a given principal.
Definition 1 (constraint structure) Let A be a set, the set
of principals. We denote the natural numbers by B (as in
time). A constraint structure is a triple flCAD$7EF$+G ffH* , where E
is a partially ordered set, and where G ffJI2ALKMBNKOE is a
relation satisfying
PRQTS!UVP
6VW ?
S!XTPZY[S]\
_^a`cbdG ff
Y
fegbdG ff
Y
ih (1)
The elements of E are called constraints.
The intuitive meaning of the statement b2G ff
YJj
is that
the principal b satisfies constraint
j
at time ' . Require-
ment (1) is just expressing the fact that if k^l , then 
is a more restrictive constraint than  , independent of the
time ' . The intention is that b_G ff
Y
j
could be considered
as a “stochastic process” with boolean values; at each point
in time the constraint
j (“randomly”) defines a subset of A
satisfying (1).
Group membership conditions is not the only type of
constraints possible. Besides depending on the principal
and the time, constraints could depend on e.g. local and
global data, and the security context in which the principal
is acting. Thus, besides group membership conditions, typ-
ical examples include role occupancy, time, and conditions
on values in different fields in some external database. One
could also allow constraints to contain side effects like e.g.
audit labelling, incrementing of counters, etc.
Constraints, now, are put together in strings, chain con-
straints, to form the basic mechanism for transfer of autho-
risation, as described in the introduction. Initially we do not
commit further to a specific notation for sets of chain con-
straints, and consider just arbitrary languages. We return to
the issue of notations in section 4.
Definition 2 (chain constraint) Given a constraint struc-
ture flmAD$7EF$nG ffH* , the set of chain constraints, E
"
(Kleene
star), is defined as the set of all strings over the alphabet
E . E
"
is a partially ordered set. If offp 0  : h4hqh(r and
s
ff2
0

:
hqhqh5t are chain constraints, then o/^ s if and
only if uOffwv and xF^yfix for zVff2{|$qh4hqh1v .
The empty string is denoted by } , and the length of o~
E
"
is G oG . Observe that, according to def. 2, the only chain
constraint that is greater or equal, or less or equal, to } , is }
itself.
A chain constraint is a way of describing restrictions on a
delegation chain. E.g., the chain constraint offffic
j
~
E
"
allows delegation chains of length four ( ffG oG ) which
begin with a principal satisfying  , are continued by two
principals (one after the other) satisfying  and end with a
principal satisfying
j
. Such a delegation chain is said to
satisfy the chain constraint o . When the notion of a dele-
gation chain is properly defined in section 3, it will follow
immediately from definition 1 that if a delegation chain sat-
isfies o and o^ s , then the delegation chain also satisfies
s
.
Chain constraints are used to control delegations of au-
thorisations. In this paper, a set of authorisations  is an
(abstract) partially ordered set. If &$(~2 and p^ ,
then the interpretation is that the authorisation  entails the
authorisation  , i.e. if a principal has authorisation  , the
principal also has authorisation  . This will be made pre-
cise in the definition of the authorisation relation.
Definition 3 (constraint certificate) A constraint certifi-
cate, or just certificate for short, is a four-tuple  ff
fl<$%&$('$<bZ* where ŁIE
"
$%~$('~Blw]{| , and
by~A . We normally write such a

as fl< $5$%'(*
Q
, and say
that

is signed or issued by the principal b . The number '
is called the time–stamp of the certificate.
The intended meaning of a certificate fl<$%&$('(* Q is the
following: at time ' the principal b is signing a statement
permitting delegation of the authorisation  , provided that
the resulting delegation chain satisfies the different con-
straints in some chain constraint in  at the future points in
time when the respective delegation steps are made. How
this is done is made precise in the following subsection.
2.2 The Certificate Database
A certificate database  is a finite set of certificates that
changes over time. The set 
Y
contains the certificates of
the database at time ' and is referred to as the state of the
database at time ' . It is required that ' is strictly greater
than all the time–stamps of the certificates contained in 
Y
(this will automatically follow from the state change defini-
tions). To avoid trivialities, the database is assumed to be
non–empty at time '3ff . All the certificates in H have
time–stamp 'ff_{ and are called initial certificates of  .
The idea is that given a certificate database at some point
in time, a principal may request a state change. A deci-
sion is made, on the basis of the information in the current
state, whether the request is granted or not. If the request is
granted, the database is updated accordingly.
Definition 4 (state change: declare) Given a database
with state 
Y
, let

fffl $5$%'(*
Q be a certificate. The state
change declare

Y 
4)) %C9)

YC 
0
is defined as follows: if there exists a certificate 
=
ff
fl<
=
$%
=
$('
=
*
Qq¡
~¢
Y
such that £^y
=
and
P¥¤
S|¦9§
6
¡
S!X1§
¤1¡
S!X!¨ª©
^
©
=`k=
©
=9~«=`pbdG ff
Y
=¬$
(2)
then the certificate  is accepted and  YC  0 ffy Y H   , oth-
erwise 
YC 
0
ffa
Y
. If  is accepted, we say that  is deriv-
able from 
=
(note that there could be several such 
=
:s).
Let us instead consider the question: what certificates
can b declare at time ' such that they can be derived from

=
? Since b must obey the conditions given in

=
, b ’s au-
thorisation  is bounded by the authorisation 
=
given in

=
.
Furthermore, b (and b ’s set of chain constraints  ) must sat-
isfy the set of chain constraints 
=
given in

=
. This amounts
to the following (which is contained in condition (2)):
1. First extract all chain constraints from 
=
having as its
first symbol a constraint that is satisfied by b at time ' ,
i.e. let

0
ff­n=
©
=9~«=#G¥b®G ff
Y
=Ch
2. Then delete the first symbol (the one corresponding to
b ) from all strings in  0 , i.e. let

:
ffffi
©
=#G
§
6
¡
S!X
=
©
=¯~°
0
Nh
This set is the weakest set of chain constraints b can use
for the delegation, or, put in another way, fl
:
$5
=
$%'(*
Q is the
most powerful delegation b can derive from

=
.
3. b can now choose to restrict 
:
to any subset 
@
Iy
:
.
4. Finally, b can choose to restrict any of the chain con-
straints
©
=
~
@
to
©
^
©
=
, thus obtaining ± , a valid
set of chain constraints for b ’s delegation.
This process can be described in two steps: first extract
the set 
:
from 
=
and then restrict 
:
to the set  ± . To
capture these two steps we introduce two notations. We be-
gin with the restriction by defining a preorder on ²
X
¨
. If
³
$%´µIE
"
, then
³
^´ if and only if
PZ¤·¶ S]¸«§1¹¥ºS|» ¼ 0
^
¼ :
h
Next we define the extraction operator ½¾|A­KD²
X
¨
KB2¿
²
X
¨
as
½®flÀbÁ$
³
$%'(*ff­
©
G
§
6
S!X

©
~
³
`ÂbdG ff
Y
h
Its clear that 
:
ffµ½®flÀbÁ$%
=
$('(* and  ± ^
:
in the pro-
cess description above (items 1-4). We can now rephrase
definition 4 in a more compact form. The certificate

ff
fl<$%&$('(*
Q is accepted (at time ' ) if and only if there exists
a certificate

=
ffLfl>
=
$%
=
$('
=
*
Q
¡
~
Y
such that a^2
=
and
^½®flÃbÄ$5
=
$%'(* .
Example 1 Assume that b delegates the authorisation  at
time ' , using the set of chain constraints
Âff­Á
0

:

@
$ 
0

:

@
±]$
j
0
j
:
$ Å
0
Å
:
Å
@
L$
by declaring the certificate

ff2fl $5$%'(*
Q
.
Now, suppose that Æ decides to delegate the authorisation

=
^ffi one step further at time '
=Ç
' . Say that Æ satisfies

0
,
j
0
and Å
0
, but not 
0
, at time '
=
. Then
½®flÆ·$% $%'7=È*ffffiÄ
:

@
$
j
:
$ÉÅ
:
Å
@

is the weakest set of chain constraints Æ can derive from

at time '
=
. If 
=
:
, 
=
@
and
j
=
:
are constraints satisfying

=
:
^y
:
, 
=
@
^y
@
and
j
=
:
^
j
:
, then Æ could e.g. choose
to restrict ½®flÆ·$% $%'
=
* to
=Êff_Á=
:
=
@
$
j
=
:
^½®fl<Æ·$% $%'7=Ë*Ìh
Finally, Æ (successfully) declares the certificate 
=
ff
fl<
=
$5
=
$('
=
*(Í .
We have defined how delegation of an authorisation takes
place. Now we define the result of a delegation chain, i.e.
which principals are possible receivers of the authorisation.
Definition 5 (authorisation relation) Given a certificate
database  with constraint structure flmAD$(EÎ$nG ffH* and autho-
risation set  , we define the authorisation relation Ï ÐÒÑ%ÓdI
AlK«lK°B as follows:
ÏÐ1Ñ%ÓJflÀbÄ$5$%'(* is true if and only if there exists a cer-
tificate 
=
ffÔfl<
=
$5
=
$%'
=
*
QÕ¡ in 
Y
and a chain constraint of
length one _~«
=
such that
bdG ff
Y
`£^V=¬h (3)
In this case we say that b ’s authorisation  is derivable from

=
at time ' .
The authorisation relation answers the question: does the
principal b have the authorisation  at time ' . The first con-
dition of (3) ensures that b is permitted as the last principal
in a delegation chain at time ' . The second condition en-
sures that the requested authorisation  is entailed by the
authorisation 
=
given in the used certificate.
Note that the last constraint in a chain constraint cor-
responds to the principal requesting the authorisation, not
the principal declaring the last delegation step. Also note
that, using the extraction operator, definition 5 could be ex-
pressed as: Ï Ð1Ñ5ÓcflÀbÁ$%&$('(* is true if and only if there exists a
certificate

=
ffÌfl<
=
$%
=
$('
=
*
Qq¡ in 
Y
such that
}3~°½dflÀbÄ$5
=
$('(*`kÂ^/
=
h
In example 1 above, any principal Ö satisfying
j
=
:
at
time '
= =3Ç
'
=
could enjoy the authorisation 
=
, since }~
½®flmÖT$%
=
$%'
= =
* if and only if ÖG ff
Y
¡ ¡¯j
=
:
.
3 Soundness
To prove soundness of the authorisation relation (and to
make the semantics of the certificates precise) we need to
formalise the concept of a delegation chain. A delegation
chain of length u is a list
×
ffffiØËflÃb
0
$5
0
$('
0
*9$4flÀb
:
$5
:
$('
:
*Z$qh4hqhÕ$+flÃb
t
$5
t
$('
t
*[Ùy$
where b
0
$4hqhqh4$<b
t
~yA , 
0
$qh4hqhÕ$5
t
~w and '
0
$4hqh4hq$('
t
~
B . The interpretation of × is that b x delegates authority  x
at time ' x to b x
 
0
for z¢ff{|$4hqhqhq$(u2{ , and that b t has
authorisation Vt at time '7t .
Given a certificate

ffffifl> $5$%'(*
Q
, we say that the delega-
tion chain × satisfies the certificate  if all of the following
conditions hold:
1. '&Ú/'
0
ÚÂ'
:
Úahqh4hÒÚ'7t
2. £Ûy
0
Ûy
:
Û­hqh4hÒÛ/Vt
3. There exist 
0
$4hqhqhq$%
t
~E such that 
0
hqhqh%
t
~
and b x G ff
YCÜ

x for zFffffi{]$qh4hqh7u .
If × satisfies

, then × was one of the delegation chains b in-
tended to permit, since (1) assures that the certificates have
arrived in the correct order, (2) assures that no authorisation
originating from b ’s certificate is more powerful than  , and
(3) assures that there is a chain constraint of length u in 
such that each constraint in this chain constraint is satisfied
by the appropriate principal at the relevant time.
Now we are in a position to prove a soundness result,
soundness in the sense that if a principal receives an au-
thorisation, each sub–chain1 of the entire delegation chain
satisfies a corresponding certificate. First we need a lemma.
Lemma 1 Assume the following-
Ï ÐÒÑ%ÓcflÃb t $% t $(' t * .
-

ff

 ffÌfl<$%&$('(*
Q
~¢
Y¶
.-
For all z¾R{fi^zÚ/u ,

x ff2fl x $% x $%' x *
QÕÜ
~¢
YCÜÈÝ ¶
.
-
Ï ÐÒÑ%ÓcflÃbÊtZ$%VtZ$('7tÒ* is derivable from  t1Þ 0 .-
For all z¾R{fi^zÚ/u ,

x is derivable from  xCÞ 0 .
Then the delegation chain
×
ff2ØËflÀb
0
$5
0
$('
0
*9$4flÈb
:
$5
:
$('
:
*Z$qh4hqhq$+flÀb
t
$%
t
$('
t
*[Ù
satisfies the certificate  .
Proof. Since Ï ÐÒÑ%ÓcflÃbÊtZ$%VtZ$('7tÒ* was derived from  t·Þ 0 ,

t1Þ
0
was derived from

t·Þ
:
and so on until

, it fol-
lows immediately from definition 4 and definition 5 that
'&Ú'
0
ÚÂ'
:
Úahqh4hÒÚ'
t and Ûy
0
Ûy
:
Ûßh4hqhÒÛ
t .
Before we prove the last part, we prove the following
claim. For any
©
=
~¢E
"
, b
=
~¢A , 
=
I/E
"
and '
=
~OB ,

©
=
#^½®flÀb
=
$%
=
$('
=
*e
§
6
¡
S!X
+
=
©
=
#^/
=
`b
=
G ff
Y
¡

=
h
(4)
If 
©
=
c^½®flàb
=
$5
=
$('
=
* , then there exists
©
= =
~®½®flÀb
=
$%
=
$('
=
*
such that
©
=
^
©
= =
by the definition of the preorder. Further-
more, by the definition of ½®flÀb
=
$%
=
$('
=
* , there exists 
=
~dE
such that 
=
©
= =
~M
=
and b
=
G ff
Y
¡

=
. Since
©
=
^
©
= =
we get

=
©
=
^ß
=
©
= =
, and hence +
=
©
=
^­
=
. Thus, the claim is
proved.
To streamline the argument, let

£ff

and ffµ .
We prove the following by induction from áMffâu down to
áff_{ :
There exist fiã·$%fiã
 
0
$qhqh4hÕ$%
t
~ E such that
4ã!ã
 
0
hqh4h%
t
«^ä&ã
Þ
0
and b x G ff
YCÜ

x for zfiffLá9$5á¬å
{|$4hqhqhq$(u .
The assumption that ÏÐ1Ñ%Ó#flÈb t $5 t $%' t * was derived from

t1Þ
0
implies that q}·^k½®flÃb t $% t·Þ
0
$('
t
* . By (4), there
exists ty~yE such that +t¥^t·Þ
0
and bÊtwG ff
YCæ
t .
1A sub–chain of a delegation chain ç is a delegation chain obtained by
deleting an initial segment of ç .
Thus, the case áyffu is proved. Assuming the induction
hypothesis for some á , ²«^2á^_u , and using the fact that

ã Þ
0
was derived from

ã Þ
:
, we find that
nãTfiã
  0
h4hqh( t ^èã Þ
0
^y½®flÃb¥ã Þ
0
$%èã Þ
:
$('(ã Þ
0
*Ìh
Again, by (4), there exists fiã Þ 0 ~ E such that
4ã Þ
0
fiãèhqh4h% t ^p&ã Þ
:
and b¥ã Þ
0
G ff
Y<éëê
¶
ã Þ
0
, prov-
ing the induction step.
We have thus proved that there exist 
0
$%
:
$qh4hqhq$5 t ~°E
such that
+
0

:
hqh4h(tZ^y  ffw
and
b x G ff
YCÜ
 x for zVff2{|$qh4hqhÕ$%uph
Since +
0

:
hqh4h(tZ ^   ff  , there exist

0
$%
:
$qh4hqh4$%fitì~E such that 
0

:
hqh4h%fitì~í and
 x ^f x for zDffî{|$qh4hqhÕ$%u . The definition of G ff implies
that b x G ff
YCÜ
 x for zÎff2{|$qh4hqh4$(u , proving that the delegation
chain × satisfies the certificate

.
Using this lemma we now prove the following soundness
result.
Theorem 1 (soundness) Assume that ÏÐ1Ñ%Ó#flÈbÄ$5$%'(* . Then
there exists a sequence of certificates


ff2fl

$%

$q{+*
Q
8
~°

$

xVff2flx7$5Áx%$('7x>*
QqÜ
~°
Y
ÜËÝ
¶
for zÎff_{]$qh4hqhq$%u#®{/$ where '7t¬ffw' , and a delegation chain
×
ffÌØÈflÃb
0
$%
0
$('
0
*Z$qh4hqh4$4flÀb
t·Þ
0
$%
t·Þ
0
$('
t·Þ
0
*¯$4flÀbÁ$%&$('(*)Ù
such that each sub–chain
×
x
ffÌØÈflÃb
x
 
0
$5
x
 
0
$('
x
 
0
*9$qhqh4hq$+flÀbÄ$5$%'(*[Ù
satisfies the corresponding certificate  x .
Proof. It’s immediate from definition 5 that if ÏÐ1Ñ%ÓJflÀbÄ$5$%'(*
holds, then this authorisation can be derived from some cer-
tificate

=
~ï
Y
with time–stamp '
=
. If '
=Fð
ffffi{ , then

=
was
added to the certificate database by the state change declare
(cf. def. 4), and hence there exists a certificate 
= =
~a
Y
¡
with time–stamp '
= =
from which

=
can be derived. Again,
either '
= =
ffffi{ or

= =
can be derived from some

= = =
~°
Y
¡ ¡
.
This process must terminate since the time–stamps of the
certificates form a strictly decreasing sequence of integers
bounded from below by { . Assume that this process halts
after u steps. This means that we have reached a certifi-
cate with time–stamp -1. If we index the certificates (and
their contents) as above, we get the sequence of certificates


$qhqh4hq$

t·Þ
0
such that the

x can be derived from the

xCÞ
0
,
and where ÏÐ1Ñ%Ó#flÈbÄ$5$%'(* can be derived from

t·Þ
0
.
The theorem now follows by repeatedly applying
lemma 1 to each sub–chain × x , y^zï^uffi{ .
Note that completeness in this context means that if a
sequence of linked certificates, starting with an initial cer-
tificate, has been declared and all sub–chains of a certain
delegation chain satisfy the corresponding certificates, then
the last tuple in the delegation chain should belong to the re-
lation Ï Ð1Ñ5Ó . But this is immediate since the assumption that
all sub–chains satisfy the corresponding certificates also im-
plies that the shortest sub–chain (the one of length 1) sat-
isfies the last certificate in the certificate chain and this is
precisely the definition of the ÏÐ1Ñ%Ó relation. On the other
hand, it is not meaningful to exclude the chain of length one,
since then the principal declaring the last certificate can al-
ways make sure that a particular principal will not receive
the authorisation in question.
4 Regular Chain Constraints
We now turn to the issue of identifying a suitable rep-
resentation for sets of chain constraints. There is consid-
erable scope for variability. The trade-off, as ever, is be-
tween simplicity of expression, algorithmic tractability, and
application needs. The obvious first choice is some suitable
fragment of regular expressions. Richer languages can be
considered too. However, as yet we have found no real use
for expressive power going beyond that of the regular lan-
guages. In fact, the suggestion we make in this section is for
a very simple language which just barely generalises ACL’s
to include a restricted form of Kleene star. Let us say that
a simple regular expression (that defines a simple regular
language) over the alphabet E is an expression of the form:
©
ff
ã
¶
0

ã
º
:
h4hqh%
ã
æ
t
, where xJ~E and á|x3~_]{]$ëñ· for
zFffÌ{]$qhqh4hÕ$(u . òfifl
©
*ÉIE
"
will denote the language it repre-
sents. A simple regular expression
©
is said to be initially
fixed if á 0 fff{ ; this implies that all strings in òfifl © * begin
with the same symbol (  0 in the notation above). Nothing
in the framework forces to adopt this requirement. How-
ever, we find it reasonable to require that certificates iden-
tify explicitly and uniquely the initial constraint/receiver of
delegation.
When restricted to initially fixed simple regular expres-
sions, the extraction operator becomes very simple to com-
pute:
½/ó(bÄ$%òfl
0

ã
º
:
h4hqh%
ã
æ
t
*$%'7ô«ff
õ
òfl
ã
º
:
h4hqh5
ã
æ
t
* if bdG ff
Y

0
$
ö
otherwise
and the result (if not empty) becomes a simple regular
language. To retain this property inductively, we require
that the principal restricting this set of chain constraints, re-
stricts it to an initially fixed simple regular language.
The rationale for this requirement is (besides to keep
things uniform and simple) that certificates of the form
ffNflCòfifl<
"
©
*Õ$%&$('(*
Q
are essentially superfluous, since any
delegation chain satisfying

has a sub–chain satisfying

and satisfying

=
ffìflCòfl
©
*Õ$5$%'(*
Q
. In particular, if

was
accepted at time ' , then

=
would also have been accepted at
time ' . Providing  with the right to delegate some author-
ity to
©
seems a bit pointless, if at the same time
©
receives
that authority directly.
The only exception to this argument is if }L~µòfl
©
*
and the sub–chain referred to above is empty. In this
case
©
is of the form
©
ffi
"
0

"
:
h4hqh%
"
t
(all exponents
are Kleene stars), including the case © ffî} . We could
mimic the argument above by replacing

=
above with

=
ff
flCòflÂ°
0
Mh4hqh4° t *q$%&$('(*
Q
. The reason the argument
works, in this case, is that any delegation chain (of length
Û­{ ) satisfying  fflfl<òfl<
"

"
0

"
:
hqhqh5
"
t
*q$%&$('(*
Q has a sub–
chain of length one satisfying

and

=
. Furthermore, as
above, if

was accepted at time ' , then

=
would also have
been accepted at time ' .
The problem is that d
0
£hqh4h|dt is not a simple
regular expression. This could easily be solved in practice
by, instead of declaring one certificate with chain constraint
set òfifl<
"

"
0

"
:
h4hqh5
"
t
* , declaring u¢åa{ certificates having
chain constraint sets òfl<
0
*Õ$qh4hqhq$%òfl
t
* and òfl<fi* , respec-
tively. Formally though, these new certificates might not all
be accepted instead of

, since we only allow one certificate
to be declared at any single point in time. A slight modifi-
cation to the state change ‘declare’, namely to allow a set of
(independent) certificates to be declared simultaneously, or
alternatively permit unions of initially fixed regular expres-
sions (see below), would solve this little problem.
Now, given a certificate

ff
ó
òfifl<
ã
¶
0
h4hqh5
ã
æ
t
*q$%&$('
4ô
Í
$
and assuming that bäG ff
Y
 (where '
Ç
') ), what sets of
chain constraints  can b use when declaring a certificate

=
ff÷fl<$%
=
$%'(*(Í (where 
=
^N ), given that 
=
should be
derivable from

?
Since we now are restricting ourselves to initially fixed
simple regular expressions, any such regular language 
bounded from above by òfl< ã
¶
0
$4hqhqh4$%
ã
æ
t
* is permitted as
chain constraint set for the certificate

=
. This implies that
 has the form ff÷òfl
©
0
h4hqh
©
tÒ* where
©
0
$4hqh4hÕ$
©
t are
simple regular expressions,
©
0
hqh4h
©
t is initially fixed, and
where
©
x has one of the following two forms:
1. If á]xOffø{ , then
©
x°fffix for some fixd~äE which
satisfies fixF^yx .
2. If á]xff2ñ , then
©
xff_#ù
Ü
¶
x
0
h4hqh%
ù
Ü
æ
Ü
xËt
Ü ( u¯xèÛa ) for some
x
0
$4hqh4hq$%fixËt
Ü
~âE which all satisfy fixàúw^Łx and
where û xÀú ~d]{|$ëñ· . Note that
©
x
ff} if u x ffa .
Typical examples of useful chain constraint sets in-
clude òfifl<
"
* , òfifl<J
"
* , òfifl<
"
j
* , òflJ
"
j
* and
òfl
"
j
Å
"
* . If we, for example, assume that chain con-
straints only represent group membership, then the (infor-
mal) semantics of these sets could roughly be described as
follows:
òfl
"
* Any member of  can be the root of a “manage-
ment tree”, managing the authorisation (by delegation)
within the the group  , and members of  can enjoy
the authorisation themselves.
òflc
"
* Same as the previous item, except that the mem-
bers of  do not receive the authorisation themselves
(assuming that /ü¢Ìff ö ).
òfl
"
j
* Any member of  can delegate the right to
members of  to create a management structure
(within  ) for managing the authorisation of members
in
j
, and members of  are also permitted to authorise
members of
j
directly. Assuming that dü
j
ff
ö
, this
(and also the next item) exemplifies “outsourcing”; the
administration of the authorisation within the group
j
is handled by  , including the right to organise the
work within  as they see fit.
òflc
"
j
* Same as the previous item, except that the
members of  are not permitted to bypass the admin-
istrator group  .
òfl
"
j
Å
"
* In this example,  and Å may be groups in
two different organisations. In this case it may be de-
sirable to constrain  ’s delegational powers so that any
administrative structures leading from  to Å must
pass by some particular group,
j
, of key account man-
agers, or liaison officers.
We finish this section with a larger example and some pos-
sible extensions. The example will exemplify how regular
chain constraint sets can be used to gradually establish man-
agement structures for managing authorisations.
Example 2 To simplify the notation in this example we
will use the names of principals and organisations (=
groups) as constraints with the obvious meaning. Lower–
case letters denote principals and upper–case letters denote
organisations. Principals represented by lower–case letters
belong to the corresponding upper–case organisation. We
will assume that the organisations  ,
j
, ý , and þ all are
contained in  , and that the organisation Å is contained in
j
.
Figure 2 depicts a possible delegation tree resulting from
the certificate flÃbÊ
"
$%&$('

*7ß . The labels of the nodes in the
tree represent the principals who are delegating and/or re-
ceiving authorisations. The labels of the edges in the tree
represent the regular chain constraint sets used in declared
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Figure 2. A delegation tree
certificates. Outgoing edges correspond to certificates de-
clared, and incoming edges correspond to delegation pow-
ers/authorisations received. Furthermore, in each delega-
tion step, the authorisation

is (possibly) restricted further
(not shown in the figure).
Now, let us examine a few steps in this delegation tree.
In the second step of the delegation chain,
b
satisfies the
leftmost constraint in
b¥
"
, and hence, can extract

"
. The
principal
b
chooses to restrict

"
to )

"
j
and
ý#þ
"
in the
two certificates
b
declares. These restrictions are permitted
since òfl ) 
"
j
*è^/òfifl<
"
* and òflý#þ
"
* ^Âòfifl<
"
* .
The principals *
0
and * : both satisfy the constraint
ý
, and can therefore successfully extract
þ
"
from
ý#þ
"
.
In *
0
’s certificate, þ
"
is restricted to + (permitted, since
òfl
+
*3^lòflþ
"
* ), thereby authorising the principal + . The
principal *
:
, on the other hand, decides to build a larger
subtree (which necessarily lives entirely within the organi-
sation þ ) by restricting þ
"
in some suitable fashion, and so
on.
The choice of initially fixed simple regular expressions
is somewhat arbitrary. The framework presented in this pa-
per clearly supports more general sets of chain constraints.
Obvious extensions might include unions of initially fixed
simple regular expressions and/or notation that enables im-
plicit unions. One could e.g. allow expressions of the
type 
0

ã
º
:
h4hqh(
ã
æ
t
, where á]xw~î;{|$ñ; or á]xyff Ø zë$-,|Ù
for non negative integers
z°Ú,
. The expression
/.
x
W
ú10 is
then interpreted as a shorthand for the regular expression

x
J
x
 
0
ïhqh4h%c
ú
. This would allow a principal to flexi-
bly express restrictions on the length of (parts of) delegation
chains in a single certificate (note that this can in principle
be achieved by declaring several certificates).
5 Scenario: Collaborating Organisations
In this section we introduce a specific scenario in order to
illustrate some of the capabilities of constrained delegation,
and the ways they could be used in practice. The scenario is
based on the case of a number of national task forces dele-
gating authority to a common UN high command (UNHC).
Each national task force will have a National Task Force
Command (NTFC) associated with it. For the sake of the
example, let NTFC
fl
.
*
be the NTFC belonging to Sweden.
The NTFC will be the “owner” of each of the national task
forces in the sense that it will from the outset possess all ad-
ministrative privileges concerning that entity. In particular,
NTFC
fl
.
*
may have assigned to it free delegational powers
in terms of a certificate
2
ffÌfl
NTFC
fl
.
*
any "
$
NTFC
fl
.
*
-resources
$%')+*
Q
where, most likely, b is the Swedish National High Com-
mand. The first component of 2

is the regular expression
delineating the possible delegation chains (in this case any
such chain must originate in the Swedish National Task
Force Command, and they in turn are empowered to del-
egate authority as they see fit). The second component,
NTFC fl
.
* -resources, indicates the scope of the delegatable
authority in this case, and ') is the certificate time stamp. So
in this case, the certificate is intended to empower NTFC fl
.
*
to delegate in any way it sees fit, any authority concerning
its own resources.
First we consider the case where NTFC fl
.
* , using certifi-
cate 2  , delegates to UNHC the authority to delegate, in any
number of steps, using UN-affiliated personnel, read access
to some Swedish surveillance information. The correspond-
ing certificate can have the following shape:
2
0
ffÌfl UNHC UNHC-stf " UN-stf $ s-info fl
.
*$%'
0
* NTFC 3 ,54 h
The UN High Command can now use 2
0
to provide UN
High Command staff (which will be a larger group than
UNHC) with administrative and decentralisable power to
provide UN-affiliated staff with access to Swedish surveil-
lance information. For instance, in the following certificate,
UN High Command staff has received, from UN High Com-
mand, administrative rights to provide operative UN staff
of some nationality, say
j
, with access to Swedish surveil-
lance information:
2
:
ffÌfl UNHC-stf op fl j *$ s-info fl
.
*Õ$('
:
* UNHC
UN High Command staff can then use this certificate to sup-
port the following authorisation
2
@
ff2fl spec-op fl
j
*q$ spec-s-info fl
.
*$%'
@
* UNHC-stf
In the process of issuing 2
@
, UN High Command staff
has constrained the scope of operative personnel and access
rights in relation to the certificate 2
:
. Observe that operative
personnel of nationality
j
will not by this certificate receive
any delegational powers regarding Swedish surveillance in-
formation.
The second example is intended to illustrate the power
and flexibility obtained when constraints are generalised to
cover not only group affiliation properties, but also more
general constraints related e.g. to time or the holding of
some condition. The intention is that NTFC fl
j
* might want
to authorise UNHC to, in an emergency situation, through
administrative channels set up by UN High Command, give
Swedish operative forces some privileges concerning sup-
plies belonging to
j
. We use a tuple-like notation for con-
junction of constraints, so that e.g. fl UNHC-stf $ alert * rep-
resents the conjunction of constraints that the issuing prin-
cipal belongs to the group UNHC-stf and that the condition
alert holds. In this way, NTFC fl
j
* might issue the certifi-
cate
fl UNHC UN-stf " fl UN-stf $ alert * op fl
.
*$ spl fl
j
*$('(* NTFC 376 4
empowering UNHC to set up an administrative organisa-
tion at will for administering access by Swedish operative
forces to
j
’s supplies, but preventing the right to access to
be ultimately granted until an emergency condition holds.
Many variations on such a scheme are possible, including
threshold-like ones where several specific parties must have
taken part in a delegation chain for the operative authority
to be possible to take effect.
6 Conclusion
We have argued that some applications, with outsourc-
ing as an archetypical example, would benefit from a more
fine-grained and flexible control over delegation than cur-
rent models admit. The standard approach to delegation is
binary: Either delegation is possible, and then no substantial
further control over the way it is used is possible, or else no
delegation is permitted. Some authors (cf. [8]) go beyond
this by permitting a fixed upper bound to be imposed on the
depth of delegation chains. We have introduced a model
which permits much finer control over the scope of delega-
tions. The central idea is to introduce (regular) expressions
that constrain the possible shapes of delegation chains, for
aspects such as depth, group/role memberships, timing con-
straints, other constraints depending on the current security
context, or just constraints depending on external data. In
this way it becomes possible to define administrative struc-
tures in a more gradual and uniform way.
Our purpose with this paper has been to introduce and
motivate the basic model. We have not, for instance,
touched upon the issue of revocation. One set of problems
pertaining to the handling of dependencies arise in the con-
text of certificate chaining (cf. [6, 4] for recent work in this
direction). Other issues arise once one starts to admit revo-
cation as a delegatable action: Who should be permitted to
revoke a given certificate, and how should this be reflected
in the delegation logic? Concerning distribution of revoca-
tion information we did not find particular challenges which
are not found equally in other related work, and so we view
this as somewhat orthogonal to the issues discussed here.
Another set of issues which we have not addressed con-
cerns the choice, design, and implementation of computa-
tional models to support constrained delegation. Our inten-
tion has been to keep the basic model as free of bias to-
wards any particular implementation regime as possible. In
principle the constrained delegation model can be applied
to a wide variety of representation and storage architectures
(say: ACL’s, directories, attribute certificates, centralised or
decentralised storage models), as well as enforcement mod-
els (push, pull, or combinations). Key functionality which
will be reported in a forthcoming paper is the efficient repre-
sentation and resolution of constraints, and the management
of delegation chains.
Acknowledgements Thanks are due to Dieter Gollmann of
Microsoft Research, Cambridge, and to Andres Martinelli,
KTH, for many discussions on this and related topics.
References
[1] M. Blaze, J. Feigenbaum, J. Ioannidis, and A. Keromytis. The
Role of Trust Management in Distributed Systems Security.
In Vitek and Jensen, editors, Secure Internet Programming:
Security Issues for Mobile and Distributed Objects. Springer-
Verlag, 1999.
[2] M. Blaze, J. Feigenbaum, and J. Lacy. Decentralised Trust
Management. In Proceedings of the 17th Symposium on Se-
curity and Privacy, pages 164 – 173, Los Alamitos, 1996.
IEEE Computer Society Press.
[3] C. M. Ellison, B. Frantz, B. Lampson, R. Rivest, B. M.
Thomas, and T. Ylonen. SPKI Certificate Theory, May 1999.
Published online: http://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-
ietf-spki-cert-theory-0.5.txt.
[4] B. S. Firozabadi and M. Sergot. Revocation Schemes for Del-
egated Authorities. In Proceeding of Policy 2002: IEEE 3rd
International Workshop on Policies for Distributed Systems
and Networks. IEEE, June 2002. In press.
[5] B. S. Firozabadi, M. Sergot, and O. Bandmann. Using Au-
thority Certificates to Create Management Structures. In Pro-
ceeding of Security Protocols, 9th International Workshop,
Cambridge, UK, April 2001. Springer Verlag. In press.
[6] A˚. Hagstro¨m, S. Jajodia, F. Parisi.Persicce, and D. Wijesek-
era. Revocation - a Classification. In The Proceeding of the
14th Computer Security Foundation Workshop. IEEE press,
2001.
[7] A. Herzberg, Y. Mass, J. Mihaeli, D. Naor, and Y. Ravid. Ac-
cess control meets public key infrastructure, or: Assigning
roles to strangers. In IEEE Symposium on Security and Pri-
vacy, pages 2–14, 2000.
[8] Li, Grosof, and Feigenbaum. A Logic-based Knowledge Rep-
resentation for Authorization with Delegation. In PCSFW:
Proceedings of The 12th Computer Security Foundations
Workshop. IEEE Computer Society Press, 1999.
